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Abstract
The present paper aims to contribute to the literature on the foundations of
incomplete contracts by providing conditions under which simple delegation of au-
thority is the solution to the complete-contracting problem of the parties. We
consider a hold-up framework where both parties proﬁt from an investment that
raises the value of an asset. Delegation turns out to be optimal if (i) the decision-
dependent parts of the payoﬀs of the parties are linear in the asset value, and (ii)
decisions have no investment-independent eﬀect. If overinvestment might be an is-
sue, delegation, however, with restricted competencies is optimal if some additional
continuity requirements are met.
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11 Introduction
Motivation We study a complete-contracting version of a hold up problem asking
under which circumstances a simple institutional arrangement, namely delegation of au-
thority, turns out to be optimal. The literature has paid considerable attention to the
question why contracts are often less complex than one might expect, and various authors
have provided conditions under which such incompleteness arises as an equilibrium phe-
nomenon. For example, it has been shown that some simple contractual forms that are
frequently observed in practice (such as the complete absence of an initial contract, non-
contingent contracts, or simple option contracts) might indeed be optimal even if ex-post
decisions are contractible ex-ante and message games are feasible.1 Surprisingly, simple
delegation of authority has not received attention in the literature on the foundations of
incomplete contracts.
Framework and results The model captures a standard hold up problem (see e.g.,
Grossman and Hart, 1986). There are two symmetrically informed, risk-neutral parties
who want to conduct a joint project. Ex-ante one of the parties may make a preparatory,
non-contractible investment to raise the value of an asset (e.g., the investor’s human
capital, a machine, etc.). The parties use the asset in the course of their project, and
both parties proﬁt from an increase in asset value. For example, an investment by an
agent in his human capital will frequently increase both his utility and the payoﬀ of
the principal. Similarly, it might be the case that A’s investment raises the value of
a physical asset (such as a machine, a brand name, a customer list, etc.) from which
both parties proﬁt. Ex-post, after uncertainty over the state of the world has been lifted,
some decisions (for example, regarding the use of the asset) have to be taken. In line
with the literature on the foundations of incomplete contracts, we assume that the ex-
post decisions, transfer payments, and messages sent between the parties are veriﬁable
by a court. Hence, these variables can be part of an initial contract. As the parties are
symmetrically informed they will always renegotiate the initial contract to an ex-post
eﬃcient outcome. Consequently, the purpose of the initial contract is to achieve ex-ante
1See e.g., Nöldeke and Schmidt (1995, 1998), Edlin and Reichelstein (1996), Che and Hausch (1999),
Hart and Moore (1999), Maskin and Tirole (1999), Segal (1999), Edlin and Hermalin (2000), and Segal
and Whinston (2002).
2eﬃciency (i.e., to provide investment incentives).
The contribution of the paper is to identify conditions on the basics of the model
under which simple delegation of authority over the ex-post decisions is the solution to
the complete-contracting problem. In particular, delegation turns out to be optimal if (i)
an increase in asset value (brought about by a larger investment) has a linear eﬀect on
the decision-dependent parts of the threatpoint payoﬀs of the parties, and if (ii) decisions
have no investment-independent eﬀects. If this condition is satisﬁed and the parties
face an underinvestment problem, it is optimal to agree on a ﬁxed transfer payment
(e.g., a ﬁxed wage) and to allow the investing party to choose any decision ex-post.
If potential overinvestment is an issue, delegation is still optimal if additionally some
continuity requirements are met. However, in this case it might be necessary to tailor
competencies in the sense that discretion needs to be contractually restricted to a subset
of possible decisions. Intuitively, ex-post a party who has authority will pick decisions
that maximize its total payoﬀ. In general, these decisions will, however, fail to maximize
the marginal return of investing from an ex-ante perspective. The above condition on
the payoﬀ functions of the parties ensures that the ex-post and ex-ante incentives with
respect to the choice of decisions are aligned.2
Aghion and Tirole (1997) have introduced the distinction between formal and real
authority in organizations. Formal authority refers to the (legal) right to take certain
decisions. In contrast, a party has real authority if, even though it does not hold for-
mal authority, its recommendations are rubber stamped. In a hold up framework, the
allocation of real authority is not an issue because in the end the parties will always
agree on ex-post eﬃcient decisions through renegotiations. Hence, in the present paper
the question is studied whether it might be optimal to grant one of the parties formal
authority over decisions. That is, we do not focus on second best decision making by
a party with real authority, but study whether the allocation of formal authority might
generate optimal investment incentives from an ex-ante perspective.
Related Literature The present paper is related to two strands of the literature.
As discussed above, the paper aims to contribute to the literature on the foundations
of incomplete contracts. As most of this literature, we consider a hold up model with
2Below we provide two examples relating to market entry and project choice to illustrate this condition.
3symmetrically informed parties.3 While in this literature other simple contractual forms
have received most of the attention, we focus on delegation as solution to the complete-
contracting problem of the parties.
Obviously, the paper is also related to the vast literature on delegation. A ﬁrst strand
of this literature identiﬁes imperfections of the contracting environment under which
simple delegation of authority turns out to be strictly optimal. For example, it has been
s h o w nt h a tt h i sm i g h tbet h ec a s ei ft h e r ea r el i m i t st oc o m m u n i c a t i o no rc o m m i t m e n t ,i fi t
is costly to process information, if agents might collude, or if contracts are incomplete (see
e.g., Aghion and Tirole, 1997; Dessein, 2002, 2004). However, the present paper is more
closely related to the second strand of the delegation literature. This part of the literature
investigates under which conditions delegation performs just as well as the best message-
dependent contract. Previously, such replication results have been derived in adverse
selection models and multi-agent moral hazard problems.4 More recently, various papers
have studied settings of partial contracting (see e.g., Aghion and Rey, 1999; Aghion,
Dewatripont, and Rey, 2002, 2004) . There, it is assumed that, while decisions are both
ex-ante and ex-post unveriﬁable, control over these decisions is contractible (or at least
transferable). Both under complete and incomplete information, simple assignments of
authority may turn out to be optimal in such settings. Our model diﬀers from the above
papers in that we assume that decisions are both ex-ante and ex-post contractible.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 the model is intro-
duced. Section 3 contains the main results. In Section 4 we discuss how our results relate
to earlier conditions for the optimality of simple contractual arrangements. This section
aims to provide some perspective on the circumstance under which one would expect to
observe delegation rather than non-contingent contracts or option contracts as solution
to the complete-contracting problem. Section 5 contains concluding remarks.
3See Section 4 for a more detailled discussion of this literature.
4With respect to the former, see e.g., Melumad, Mookherjee and Reichelstein (1992, 1995), McAfee
and McMillan (1995), Mookherjee and Reichelstein (1997, 2001), and Baliga and Sjöström (2001); with
respect to the latter, see e.g., Baliga and Sjöström (1998).
42 The Model
We consider a standard holdup model with two risk-neutral, symmetrically informed
parties, P and A, who want to conduct a joint project. Party P, the principal, has to
rely on A, the agent, who may make a preparatory investment i ∈ [0,i] that increases the
value of an asset. For example, A m i g h tb ea b l et oi n v e s ti nh i sh u m a nc a p i t a lt op e r f o r m
better in later tasks. Alternatively, A might possess some special skills that allow him
to raise the value of a physical asset. After the investment has been made, the project
is carried out. That is, some decisions d =( d1,...,dn) ∈ D have to be taken, where
D = D1 × ... × Dn ⊂ <n. For example, these decisions might relate to the production
of a good or the provision of a service. While the investment has to be made by A,w e
assume that both P and A are, in principle, able to take the decisions. Figure 1 depicts
the sequence of events.













Figure 1: The sequence of events
At date 1, the parties sign a contract C. Initial contracts are discussed in more detail
below. At date 2, A invests i ∈ [0,i] at costs c(i).A tdate 3,u n c e r t a i n t y  ∈ E over the
ex-post state of the world (i, ) is resolved, where E denotes the set of possible random
states. A’s investment increases the value a(i, ) of the asset. We assume that c and
a are continuously diﬀerentiable in i,a n da,ai > 0, aii < 0, ci > 0, cii ≥ 0.5 As the
ex-post state of the world is now known to both parties, P and A send messages θ
P and
θ
A, respectively, about the ex-post state of the world (if the initial contract is message-
dependent), where θ
P,θ
A ∈ Θ ≡ [0,i] ×E. Before decisions are taken and payments are
made at date 4, the parties may possibly renegotiate the initial contract C.
In line with the literature on the hold-up problem we assume that, while all variables
are observable to the parties, an initial contract cannot directly condition on the ex-post
5Throughout, subscripts denote partial derivatives.
5state of the world (i, ). With respect to decisions it is clear that if only control over
decisions (but not the decisions themselves) were contractible, some form of delegation
of authority would be the only feasible way of generating investment incentives. In order
to show that even in a complete-contract setting delegation might emerge as solution
to the contracting problem, we, however, assume that (i) the decisions d, (ii) transfer
payments between the parties, and (iii) the messages sent at date 3 are veriﬁable by a
court, and hence can be part of an initial contract.6 The revelation principle allows to
restrict attention to direct revelation mechanisms that (i) specify the decisions and an
transfer payment from P to A as functions of messages of the parties about the ex-post
state of the world, and (ii) under which truthful reporting of the ex-post state by both
parties is a Nash equilibrium on and oﬀ the equilibrium path.7 Formally, a contract C is
deﬁned as a mapping [ b d,b t ]:Θ × Θ → D ×< , where Θ denotes the space of possible
ex-post states of the world.
For the moment, considered ﬁxed contract terms b d ∈ D and b t ∈ <. If renegotiations
would fail, the parties would realize their threatpoint payoﬀs. The threatpoint payoﬀs
of P and A depend on the initial contract C.T h e y a r e g i v e n b y πP(b d,a(i, ), ) − b t
and πA(b d,a(i, ), )+b t,r e s p e c t i v e l y ,w h e r eπP and πA are assumed to be continuously
diﬀerentiable in i. Hence, as discussed above, the threatpoint payoﬀso fboth parties
may depend on the value of the asset.8 As the parties are symmetrically informed,
they will, however, always succeed in renegotiating the initial contract and take ex-
post eﬃcient decisions at date 4. Thereby, they create an ex-post surplus φ(i, ) ≡
maxd∈D{πP(d,a(i, ), )+πA(d,a(i, ), )}, where we assume that φ(i, ) is non-negative,
continuously diﬀerentiable in i, φi > 0,a n dφii < 0. P and A share the resulting rene-
gotiation surplus in Nash-bargaining with bargaining powers β and (1−β), respectively,
where β ∈ (0,1). Hence, the post-renegotiation payoﬀs of P and A consist of their
threatpoint payoﬀsa n dt h e i rs h a r e so ft h er e n e g o t i ation surplus. They are given by
6An extension of the model to the case that some of the decisions are not contractible ex-ante would
be straightforward.
7Given our assumptions, there will exist ex-ante transfer payments that ensure participation by both
parties. As such payments have no eﬀect on investment incentives they are not considered explicitly.
8If the investment would aﬀect the threatpoint payoﬀ of only one of the parties, a non-contingent
contract specifying ﬁxed decisions and payments would be optimal if some technical assumptions are
met (see Section 4 for a more detailed discussion).
6Π
P(b d,b t,i, ) ≡ [ π
P(b d,a(i, ), )−b t ]+β ·[φ(i, )−π
P(b d,a(i, ), )−π
A(b d,a(i, ), )], (1)
and
Π
A(b d,b t,i, ) ≡ [ π
A(b d,a(i, ), )+b t ]+(1−β)·[φ(i, )−π
P(b d,a(i, ), )−π
A(b d,a(i, ), )],( 2 )
respectively.
As ex-post eﬃciency is achieved through renegotiations, the purpose of the initial
contract C is to generate investment incentives. The initial contract aﬀects A’s investment
incentives because it inﬂuences the threatpoint payoﬀs of the parties, and hence the
distribution of the ex-post surplus. Ex-ante eﬃciency (i.e., the ﬁrst-best outcome) is
achieved if the optimal contract induces an investment i∗ that maximizes the ex-ante
expected net surplus of the relationship. Formally, i∗ = argmaxi∈[0,i]{E[φ(i, )] − c(i)},
where we assume that i∗ > 0.
3 Delegation of Formal Authority
In this section we present conditions under which delegation of authority to party A
turns out to be optimal. In the following, it will be useful to distinguish two cases.
First, we study an underinvestment case, where even under the optimal contract A’s
investment falls short of the ﬁrst-best investment level i∗. Subsequently, we provide
conditions for the optimality of delegation that do not depend on whether the parties
face an underinvestment problem or whether overinvestment might be an issue.
Case 1: an underinvestment setting Since A’s investment aﬀects the asset value, it
has a direct eﬀect on the payoﬀs of both parties. If the investment has a suﬃciently strong
positive eﬀect on P, then even under the optimal contract A’s investment might fall short
of the ﬁrst-best investment level i∗ (see e.g., Che and Hausch, 1999). Intuitively, while A’s
investment raises his own threatpoint payoﬀ, it also raises P’s threatpoint payoﬀ which, in
turn, lowers the available renegotiation surplus, and hence reduces A’s incentive to invest.
In such an underinvestment case, delegation of authority to A is optimal if and only if
it leads to an investment level weakly above the equilibrium investment under any other
7feasible contract.9 While this is obvious, it is not straightforward to fully characterize
conditions on the basics of the model that ensure that delegation leads to maximum
investment. For example, this is the case because the post-renegotiation payoﬀ of A does
not only depend on the threatpoint payoﬀs of the parties but also on the distribution of
bargaining power between them. As a consequence, we do not aim to fully characterize
under which conditions delegation is optimal, but present easily interpretable suﬃcient
conditions. These conditions are independent of the distribution of bargaining power and
do not impose assumptions on derived entities.
Suppose for the moment that authority is indeed delegated to A (i.e., the initial
contract speciﬁes a ﬁxed transfer payment b t ∈ <,a n dt h a tA is free to choose any b d ∈ D
ex-post). Given that he has authority, ex-post A will pick decisions b dA(i, ) that maximize
his post-renegotiation payoﬀ.F o r m a l l y ,
b d
A(i, ) ∈ argmax
e d∈D
Π
A(b d,b t,i, ),( 3 )
where b dA(i, ) is assumed to exist for all (i, ),a n db t ∈ <. In general, the decisions b dA(i, )
that are optimal from an ex-post perspective will, however, fail to maximize A’s marginal
investment return E[ΠA
i (b d,i, )] from an ex-ante perspective.10 However, ex-post and
ex-ante incentives (with respect to the choice of decisions) are aligned if the following
condition is met.
Condition 1 Conditional on   and b d, (i) the decision-dependent parts of the threat-
point payoﬀs of the parties are linear in the asset value, and (ii) the decisions have no
investment-independent eﬀect. Formally, the threatpoint payoﬀs can be expressed as
π
j(b d,a(i, ), ) ≡ ρ
j(b d, ) · a(i, )+γ
j(a(i, ), ),
where γj is continuously diﬀerentiable in i for j = P,A.
In the following, we provide two examples to illustrate Condition 1. For simplicity, in
both examples we assume that γP = γA ≡ 0.
9Below we provide a condition under which the parties indeed face an underinvestment problem.
10Deﬁne e dA(i, ) ∈ argmaxe d∈D ΠA
i (b d,b t,i, ). In general, it will not be true that e dA(i, )=b dA(i, ) for
all i, . Note that Proposition 1 below goes through whenever this equality is met in every ex-post state,
and Condition 1 below provides a suﬃcient condition on the basics of the model under which this is the
case.
8Example 1 (market entry) Suppose a principal P has hired an agent A to develop a
new service or product. On the one hand, the value a(i, ) of the product depends on
how much eﬀort i the agent exerts. On the other hand, it may also depend on some
random events. Ex-post a decision has to be made about whether the parties should or
should not enter the market with the newly developed product. If no market entry occurs
(i.e., if d =0 ), both parties realize zero payoﬀs (except for the investment costs, which,
however, are already sunk). If it is decided to enter the market (i.e., if d =1 ), assume
(for simplicity) that P derives a (possibly monetary) return of a(i, ). Moreover, the more
successful the product turns out to be, the larger the reputation of being a good innovator
that A acquires: suppose that (in a given random state) the eﬀect on A’s reputation is
proportional to the success of the product. That is, assume that A’s payoﬀ upon market
entry is given by α( ) · a(i, ),w h e r eα( ) > 0. To provide an alternative version of this
market entry example, one could assume that P and A are partners in a joint venture
contemplating market entry with the product that has been developed by A.L e t a(i, )
denote the proﬁt per unit sold by either of the partners. Suppose that upon market entry
P and A face stochastic market demands p( ) and α( ) respectively (e.g., suppose that
random fractions of consumers arrive at either partner’s store), where p,α > 0.I nt h i s
case, the payoﬀso fP and A are zero if there is no market entry, and they are given by
p( ) · a(i, ) and α( ) · a(i, ), respectively, otherwise.
Example 2 (project choice) Consider a more general version of Example 1. Similar
to Aghion and Tirole (1997), suppose there are n possible projects P and A might pursue.
Ex-ante the agent may invest to raise his human capital a(i, ). Again, the parties can
decide either to conduct or not to conduct a certain project. If the respective project is
not conducted, their payoﬀs equal zero. Suppose that if project k =1 ,...,n goes ahead, P
and A derive payoﬀs pk( ) · a(i, ) and αk( ) · a(i, ), respectively, which in every random
state are proportional to A’s human capital and where pk > 0. If more than one project
can be pursued at a time, one would have d ∈ {0,1}n. Alternatively, if the parties can
engage in at most one project (e.g., due to technological constraints), one would have
d ∈ {0,1,...,n}. The latter case has been studied by Aghion and Tirole (1997). However,
their model diﬀers in that they consider a problem of information acquisition where project
choice is not contractible ex-ante because projects are assumed to be indistinguishable at
that stage.
9In both of the above examples, even if d is contractible (as assumed in the present
paper), simple delegation of authority to A is optimal.11 In the following, we ﬁrst provide
an intuition for the optimality of delegation and discuss Condition 1 in more detail. We
then state and prove our result formally.
Intuitively, if the asset value (i.e., the value of A’s human capital or the value of a
physical asset) has a linear eﬀect on the payoﬀs of the parties, A’s post-renegotiation
payoﬀ can be expressed as the product of the asset value and a term that only depends
on decisions and the random state (possibly plus decision-independent terms). That is,
Condition 1 implies:
Π
A(b d,b t,i, )=a(i, ) · [depends only on b d and  ]+[ independent of b d] (4)
Equation (4) implies that in each ex-post state the decisions that maximize A’s total
payoﬀ also maximize his marginal investment return. This would in general not be true if
decisions also had an investment-independent eﬀect because in this case (4) would contain
an additional term that would depend on d but not on i.W h i l et h er e t u r nρj(b d, )·a(i, )
from the use of asset may very well be idiosyncratic, a likewise argument would apply if
the idiosyncrasy would not enter in a multiplicative way.
Note that the above observation (i.e., equation (4)) does not immediately imply that
delegation is optimal: given a message-dependent mechanism, in equilibrium decisions
and transfers might depend on the investment level (through the truthfully reported
messages); thereby potentially introducing an additional marginal eﬀect of the invest-
ment. However, by applying an insight of Maskin and Moore (1999) it is possible to
prove the following result.
Proposition 1 If Condition 1 holds and the parties face an underinvestment problem,
delegation of authority to A is optimal. That is, a contract is optimal that speciﬁes a ﬁxed
payment b t ∈ < and prescribes that party A is free to choose any b d ∈ D at the ex-post
stage.
Proof. Deﬁne θ ≡ (i, ), b Πj(θ
P,θ




A),i, ),a n dΠ
j
(θ) ≡
b Πj(θ,θ,θ) for j = P,A.A no p t i m a lc o n t r a c tC∗ : Θ × Θ → D ×<solves
11Note that this would remain to be true if the decisions in the above examples would be allowed to
be probabilistic.
10max{E [φ(i, )] − c(i)} subject to (i) the truth-telling constraints Π
P












A, and subject to (ii) the constraint
that i ∈ argmaxe i {E[Π
A
(b i, )] − c(b i)}. Note that the ex-post message game between the










= φ(θ) for all θ
P,θ
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0,θ) − b ΠA (θ,θ
0,θ
0) for all θ,θ
0 ∈ Θ (see e.g., Maskin and Moore, 1999). Hence,
for any θ =( i, ) and θ













0),a(i, ), ) − (1 − β) · πP
i (b d(θ,θ
0),a(i, ), )}
=( 1− β) · φi(i, )+[ β · γA
i (a(i, ), ) − (1 − β) · γP
i (a(i, ), )]
+limsup
i0→i
{ai(i, ) · [β · ρA(b d(θ,θ
0), ) − (1 − β) · ρP(b d(θ,θ
0), )]},
≤ (1 − β) · φi(i, )+[ β · γA
i (a(i, ), ) − (1 − β) · γP
i (a(i, ), )]
+ai(i, ) · [β · ρA(b dA(i, ), ) − (1 − β) · ρP(b dA(i, ), )],
(5)
where the second inequality follows from (3) and Condition 1. As the parties face an
underinvestment problem, it is optimal to maximize A’ investment incentives. Given the
above inequality, this is achieved by specifying in the ex-ante contract that A receives
some ﬁxed payment b t ∈ < a n dt h a th ei sf r e et oc h o o s ea n yb d ∈ D ex-post.
In the appendix Proposition 1 is extended to the case of multi-dimensional eﬀort
provision by A.
A few remarks might be useful. First, Proposition 1 describes a setting where an ini-
tial delegation-contract, which grants A authority, is optimal. Now, if all decisions relate
to the use of the asset it would be equivalent for the parties to just assign ownership of
t h ea s s e tt oA because this would lead to the same investment incentives. In this sense,
Proposition 1 provides conditions under which the ad-hoc restriction to simple assign-
ments of ownership made by the property-rights theory of the ﬁrm (see e.g., Grossman
and Hart, 1986; Hart and Moore, 1990; Hart, 1995) is innocuous.12 Second, note that
for Proposition 1 to hold, the net expected payoﬀ of A does not need to be concave in the
investment, which will in general not be the case given that the investment has a direct
12On this issue, see e.g., Che and Hausch (1999), Maskin and Tirole (1999), Roider (2004).
11eﬀect on both parties. Third, Condition 1 implies that, while the incentive-maximizing
decisions b dA(i, ) may depend on the random state  , they do not vary with the level of A’s
investment.13 Finally, Proposition 1 focuses on an underinvestment problem. Naturally,
the question arises under which conditions such an underinvestment setting indeed arises:
if Condition 1 holds and A has authority over decisions, he will select an investment level
e i deﬁned by




A(i, ),i, )] − c(i)}. (6)
It turns out that overinvestment (i.e., e i>i ∗)m i g h tb ea ni s s u ei fγP
i ≥ 0 and
if A’s preferred decisions are unfavorable for P in the sense that they would cause his
threatpoint payoﬀ to be negative. In such a case, additional investment by A would reduce
P’s threatpoint payoﬀ even further, thereby possibly providing A with private investment
returns above social investment returns. If, on the other hand, ρP(b d, ) ≥ 0 for all b d and
 ,t h e nA’s investment falls short of the eﬃcient investment level i∗.I n t u i t i v e l y , i f f o r
any ex-post decision A’s investment has a positive eﬀect on P’s threatpoint payoﬀ, A’s
return from investing is below the social return in any ex-post state.
Lemma 1 If ρP ≥ 0 and γP
i ≥ 0, the parties face an underinvestment problem.
Proof. A’s investment falls short of the eﬃcient investment level if ΠA
i (b dA(i, ),b t,i, ) ≤
φi(i, ) for all i and  .D e ﬁne d∗(i, ) ∈ argmaxd∈D{πP(d,a(i, ), )+πA(d,a(i, ), )}.
Condition 1 implies that, for a given  , b dA(i, ) and d∗(i, ) do not vary in i. Hence, sub-
stituting for ΠA
i (b dA(i, ),b t,i, ) and φi(i, ), and noting that γP
i (a(i, ), ) ≥ 0 for all i and
 , reveals that a suﬃcient condition for underinvestment is given by β ·{[ρA(b dA(i, ), )+
ρP(b dA(i, ), )]−[ρA(d∗(i, ), )+ρP(d∗(i, ), )]} ≤ ρP(b dA(i, ), ) for all i and  . The def-
inition of d∗(i, ) implies that the left-hand side of this inequality is non-positive. Hence,
the above inequality is satisﬁed for all (i, ) because ρj(b d, ) ≥ 0 by assumption.
Case 2: settings where overinvestment might be an issue In the following, we
provide (slightly stronger) conditions for the optimality of delegation that do, however,
not rely on the parties facing an underinvestment problem. Given Condition 1, A has
13In this sense, Condition 1 is a polar case to a condition introduced by Segal and Whinston (2002,
Condition H±) who require that, for a given i, the incentive-maximizing decisions do not vary across
random states   (for a more detailled discussion, see again Section 4).
12maximal investment incentives if he has authority. If potential overinvestment is an
issue, A’s investment incentives can be reduced by restricting his freedom of choice (i.e.,
by specifying in the initial contract that not D but only some subset D∗ ⊆ D constitutes
the set of decisions from which A may select ex-post): if A is only allowed to choose from
D∗, the incentive-maximizing decisions b dA(i, ) might not be feasible resulting in lower
returns from investing. Hence, by carefully choosing D∗ i tm i g h tb ep o s s i b l et op r o v i d eA
with ﬁrst-best investment incentives. This is indeed the case if some additional (arguably
mild) requirements are met.
Condition 2 Decisions are continuous and have a continuous eﬀect, and null-decisions
exist. Formally, (i) D ≡ [0,d
1
] × ... × [0,d
n
], (ii) ρj(b d, ) is continuous in b d, and (iii)
ρj((0,...,0), )=0for all   and j = P,A.
Part (iii) of Condition 2 states that if no decisions are taken (i.e., if the status quo
is maintained), the decision-dependent parts of the threatpoint payoﬀs are zero. Jointly,
Conditions 1 and 2 ensure that if potential overinvestment is an issue, some form of
restricted delegation leads to the ﬁrst-best outcome. To illustrate this, suppose that
allowing A to choose from D would lead to overinvestment. First, Conditions 1 and
2 imply that there exists a truncated choice set D∗ ⊆ D such that (given that A is
allowed to choose any b d ∈ D∗ ex-post), i∗ satisﬁes the ﬁrst-order condition of A’s ex-ante
maximization problem. Second, as discussed above, given that the asset value aﬀects
the threatpoint payoﬀs of both parties, the post-renegotiation payoﬀ of A is in general
not concave in his investment (even if a and φ are well-behaved). However, if he has
authority, A’s post-renegotiation payoﬀ turns out to be concave if null-decisions exist
and γj(a(i, ), ) ≡ e γ
j( ) ∀  holds for j = P,A: in this case the ﬁrst term in square
brackets in (4) is non-negative, and the second term in square brackets is strictly concave
in i.
Proposition 2 If Conditions 1 and 2 hold, and γj(a(i, ), ) ≡ e γ
j( ) for all   and
j = P,A, delegation of authority to A is optimal, but it might be necessary to restrict
competencies. That is, a contract of the following form is optimal: the parties agree on a
ﬁxed payment b t ∈ < and prescribe that party A is free to choose any b d ∈ D∗ at the ex-post
stage, where D∗ ⊆ D.
13Proof. Ife i<i ∗, Proposition 1 implies that unrestricted delegation of authority (i.e.,
D∗ = D) is optimal. Next, consider the case e i ≥ i∗.D e ﬁne a truncated decision space
D(ω) ≡ [0,d
1
− ω1] × ... × [0,d
n
− ωn],w h e r eωl ∈ [0,d
l
] ∀l ∈ {1,...,n}.I n a n a l o g y t o
(3), deﬁne
e ρ
A( ,ω) ≡ max
e d∈D(ω)
{β · ρ
A(b d, ) − (1 − β) · ρ
P(b d, )}. (7)
Conditions 1 and 2 ensure that solutions to (7) exists for all   and ω.C o n d i t i o n 2
implies e ρ
A( ,ω) ≥ 0 ∀ ,ω. This observation together with the concavity of E[φ(i, )]
implies E[(1 − β) · φii(i, )+aii(i, ) · e ρ
A( ,ω)] < 0 ∀i,ω. Hence, it follows from e i ≥ i∗
that E[ai(i∗, ) · e ρ





). Condition 2 implies e ρ
A( ,ω)=0 , and hence E[ai(i∗, ) · e ρ
A( ,ω)] = 0.
Moreover, as ρA and ρP are continuous in b d, it follows from Berge’s theorem of the
maximum that the value function e ρ
A( ,ω) is continuous in ω. Hence, the Intermediate
Value Theorem implies that there exists an ω∗ such that E[(1 − β) · φi(i∗, )+ai(i∗, ) ·
e ρ
A( ,ω∗)] = E[φi(i∗, )].C o n s e q u e n t l y , i f p a r t y A is free to choose from the set D(ω∗)
ex-post, he ﬁnds it optimal to invest i = i∗ ex-ante.
As the proof of Proposition 2 shows, one simple way to optimally restrict competencies
is to rule out extreme choices. That is, a choice set of the form D∗ =[ 0 ,d
1
− ω1] × ... ×
[0,d
n
− ωn],w h e r eω1,...,ωn ≥ 0,i so p t i m a l . 14
To summarize, we provide two sets of conditions on the basics of the model under
which simple delegation of authority is the solution to the complete-contracting problem
of the parties. First, if the parties face an underinvestment problem and Condition 1
holds, unrestricted delegation of authority to A is optimal because it maximizes A’s in-
centives to invest. Second, if overinvestment might be an issue, delegation is nevertheless
optimal if, in addition to Condition 1, decisions are continuous and have a continuous
eﬀect, and null-decisions exist. In this second case it might be optimal to restrict compe-
tencies by allowing A to choose from only a subset of the feasible decisions. In the next
section, we relate our results (and in particular Condition 1) to earlier ﬁndings on the
optimality of simple contractual forms.
14While in the present model restricting competencies serves to reduce investment incentives, Szalay
(2004) shows that such partial delegation may foster incentives to acquire relevant information. Partial
forms of delegation may also emerge if a principal can only commit to a decision rule, but not to monetary
transfers (e.g., Holmstrom, 1984; Melumad and Shibano, 1991; Armstrong, 1994).
144 Non-Contingent Contracts, Option Contracts, and
Delegation: An Overview
In this section we discuss the literature on the foundations of incomplete contracts in more
detail. Various authors have provided conditions on the payoﬀ functions of the parties
under which simple contracts (such as the complete lack of a contract, non-contingent
contracts, or options) turn out to be optimal.15 In order to provide some perspective
under which circumstances non-contingent contracts, option contracts, or delegation of
authority are optimal, in the following it is discussed how Condition 1 relates to these
earlier results.
The most general conditions under which parties can optimally restrict themselves to
non-contingent contracts (i.e., contracts where the speciﬁed decisions and payments do
not depend on messages sent by the parties) have been provided by Segal and Whinston





id > 0. In this case, it follows from equation (2) that the marginal eﬀect of a change in
b d on A’ investment return is given by
Π
A
id(b d,b t,i, )=β · π
A
id(b d,a(i, ), ) − (1 − β) · π
P
id(b d,a(i, ), ). (8)
The investment is said to have a mainly selﬁsh eﬀect if ΠA
id(b d,b t,i, ) ≥ 0, and it is
said to have a mainly cooperative eﬀect otherwise. Segal and Whinston (2002) show
that non-contingent contracts are optimal if (i) it does not depend on the realization of
uncertainty   whether the investment has a mainly selﬁsh or mainly cooperative eﬀect on
t h ei n v e s t i n gp a r t y ,a n di f( i i )s o m ea d d i t i o n a lr e q u i r e m e n t sa r em e t( s e et h e i rC o n d i t i o n
H± and Proposition 4).16 For example, their result applies if the investment is purely
selﬁsh, i.e., if πA
i >π P
i ≡ 0 (a case considered by Edlin and Reichelstein, 1996), or if
the investment is purely cooperative, i.e., if πP
i >π A
i ≡ 0 (a case considered by Che and
15In a hold-up setting, the complete lack of an initial contract may also be optimal if the trading
environment is suﬃciently complex (see e.g., Hart and Moore, 1999; Segal, 1999). Considering alternative
models, various authors have shown that the incompleteness of contracts might arise due to strategic
ambiguity, contracting costs, and signaling or screening problems.
16More generally, Segal and Whinston (2002) prove their result for the case that the decisions that
minimize (respectively maximize) the investment returns of a party do not depend on the realization of
 .
15Hausch, 1999).17 However, Segal and Whinston’s Condition H± will frequently fail to
hold if the investment has a direct eﬀect on both parties. In such hybrid cases, the sign
of ΠA
id(b d,b t,i, ) depends on (i) the distribution of bargaining power, (ii) the impact of
the investment on πA and πP, and (iii) the realization of the random state  . Hence, in
particular if the parties are relatively symmetric (i.e., if β is close to 0.5, and πA
id and πP
id
are of similar size), it is likely that it depends on   whether the eﬀect of the investment
is mainly selﬁsh or mainly cooperative.
To summarize, in the case of symmetric parties non-contingent contracts will often
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Figure 2: Non-contingent contracts versus delegation of authority
In the case of asymmetric parties, non-contingent contracts are likely to be optimal,
but if additionally Propositions 1 or 2 hold (in particular if the asset value has a linear
eﬀect on the payoﬀs of the parties), delegation of authority is likely to be optimal as well.
On the other hand, if the parties are relatively symmetric, the above discussion sug-
gests that the parties cannot restrict themselves to non-contingent contracts, in which
case an optimal contract is necessarily message-dependent. While in such cases so far rel-
atively little is known with respect to the form of optimal simple contracts, there do exist
some interesting results with respect to the optimality of option contracts, i.e., contracts
where the contractually speciﬁed decisions and payments only depend on the messages
sent by one of the parties (see e.g., Segal and Whinston, 2002, Proposition 8). However,
17As the present paper, Che and Hausch (1999) allow for investments to have direct eﬀects on both
parties. However, their focus is on providing conditions under which the complete absence of an initial
contract is optimal. They show that this is the case if the eﬀect of A’s investment on P is large.
16such option contracts might still take a rather complicated form.18 We provide conditions
under which the parties can optimally restrict themselves to the even simpler institutional
arrangement of delegation of authority. Hence, perhaps surprisingly, delegation might be
more likely to be observed when parties are relatively symmetric.
Finally, it might be instructive to compare Condition 1 with a result of Edlin and
Reichelstein (1996). They show that non-contingent contracts might induce eﬃcient two-
sided investments. While two-sided investments are beyond the scope of the present
paper, a discussion of their payoﬀ condition is useful because our Condition 1 takes a
similar form. Edlin and Reichelstein (1996) assume that the threatpoint payoﬀso ft h e
parties can be expressed as
π
j(i
j, b d, )=b π
j(i




for j =1 ,2,w h e r eij denotes party j’s investment and where b d ∈ [0,d] denotes a vari-
able trade quantity.19 Given that we consider a one-sided investment, a comparison of
Condition 1 with (9) is not straightforward, but a few points are noteworthy. While
(9) and Condition 1 have in common that investments and decisions (respectively func-
tions thereof) only interact multiplicatively, there are some important diﬀerences. First,
while (9) requires that the threatpoint payoﬀ of each party depends only on its own
investment (i.e., investments are purely selﬁsh), in the present model both threatpoint
payoﬀs depend on the asset value. Second, in contrast to Condition 1, (9) allows for an
investment-independent eﬀect e π
j(b d, ) of decisions. As a consequence, neither of the two
conditions is a special case of the other.
18It has been shown that in settings where parties invest sequentially,i tm i g h ts u ﬃce to restrict
oneself to dichotomous option contracts that allow for a choice between just two decision-payment pairs
(see e.g., Nöldeke and Schmidt, 1998; Edlin and Hermalin, 2000). For the one-sided investment case
Schweizer (2000) has shown that dichotomous options are optimal if for any decision the net expected
post-renegotiation payoﬀ of the investing party is a strictly single-peaked function of the investment, and
if some additional assumptions are met.
19Segal and Whinston (2002) extend Edlin and Reichelstein’s (1996) result: they show that in the
two-sided investment case non-contingent contracts are optimal if (i) their Condition H± (see above)
is satisﬁed, (ii) the decision-dependent parts of the post-renegotiation payoﬀs of the parties depend on
investments only through a one-dimensional aggregate measure, and (iii) some additional assumptions
are met.
175C o n c l u s i o n
The present paper aims to contribute to two strands of the literature. First, in the lit-
erature on delegation it has been shown that delegation might perform just as well as
the best message-dependent mechanism. The present paper diﬀe r sf r o mt h i ss t r a n do f
the literature by providing such a replication result in a symmetric information environ-
ment where all ex-post decisions are contractible ex-ante. Second, the literature on the
foundations of incomplete contracts has identiﬁed circumstances under which simple con-
tractual arrangements (such as non-contingent contracts, options, or the complete lack
of an initial contract) are a solution to the complete-contracting problem. The present
paper diﬀers from this literature by its focus on delegation.
We provide two sets of conditions on the basics of the model under which simple dele-
gation of authority is the solution to the complete-contracting problem. First, delegation
is optimal if (i) the decision-dependent parts of the payoﬀs of the parties are linear in
the asset value, (ii) the decisions have no investment-independent eﬀect, and (iii) the
parties face an underinvestment problem. Second, if overinvestment might be an issue,
delegation is optimal if (a) a slightly stronger version of Condition 1 holds, (b) the ex-post
decisions are continuous and have a continuous eﬀect, and (c) null-decisions exist. While
in the former case unrestricted competencies are desirable, in the latter case it may be
optimal to tailor A’ competencies contractually.
18Appendix
Extension: Multi-Dimensional Eﬀort Provision. Frequently, an agent will engage
in various preparatory activities. If eﬀort components are strategic complements, Propo-
sition 1 can be extended to the case of multi-dimensional eﬀort provision. Under slight
abuse of notation, suppose that A chooses a k-dimensional eﬀort vector i ≡ (ι1,...,ιk),
k ≥ 1, from a compact subset of <k. For simplicity, assume that investment costs
are linear, i.e., c(i)=ι1 + ... + ιk. Now, suppose that authority over ex-post deci-
sions is delegated to A and he receives a ﬁxed payment b t ∈ <. In this case, deﬁne
ιl(ι−l) as the lth eﬀort component that A will choose ex-ante for a given ι−l. Formally,
ιl(ι−l) ∈ argmaxιl {ΠA(b dA(i, ),b t,i, ) − ιl}, for l =1 ,..,n. If Condition 1 holds, null-
decisions exist, and γj(a(i, ), ) ≡ e γ
j( ) for all i,   and j = P,A,t h e nιl(ι−l) and the
equilibrium investment vector e i are unique. If, in addition, the investment components
are strategic complements, delegation is indeed desirable because, for each investment
component, it is optimal to maximize A’s incentives. Figure 3 below serves to illustrate
Proposition 3.
Proposition 3 Suppose A provides multi-dimensional eﬀort and the parties face an un-
derinvestment problem. If Conditions 1, 2(iii), γj(a(i, ), ) ≡ e γ
j( ) ∀i, ,a n daιlιm,φ ιlιm >
0 hold for all l 6= m and j = P,A, delegation of authority over ex-post decisions to A
is optimal. That is, a contract is optimal that speciﬁes some ﬁxed payment b t ∈ < and
prescribes that party A is free to choose any b d ∈ D at the ex-post stage.
Proof. Condition 2(iii) implies that β·ρA(b dA(i, ), )−(1−β)·ρP(b dA(i, ), ) ≥ 0 ∀i, .
Hence, for all l, ιl(ι−l) is unique and non-decreasing in ι−l. Moreover, given delegation,
the equilibrium investment vector e i =( e ι
l,e ι
−l) is unique (where e i is implicitly deﬁned by
ιl(e ι
−l)=e ι
l for all l). Similar to the proof of Proposition 1, it follows from Condition 1








A(i, ), )] ∀i, .( 1 0 )
Hence, for a given ι−l,t h el-th investment component chosen when authority is delegated
to A is weakly larger than the ιl chosen under any other contract C.D e ﬁne Ω ≡ {i |
19ιl ≤ ιl(ι−l) for all l}. The above inequality together with the fact that the functions ιl
are non-decreasing in their arguments implies that (a) any investment equilibrium b i(C)
under an arbitrary contract C is in the set Ω (i.e., b i(C) ∈ Ω ∀C), and (b) b il(C) ≤e ι
l ≤ ι∗l

















Figure 3: Delegation and multi-dimensional eﬀort provision: an example where i ≡
(ι1,ι 2).
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